Case Comments: Constitutional Law: Reaffirming Every Floridian’s Broad and Fundamental Right to Privacy by Dick, Diane Lourdes
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons 
Faculty Scholarship 
1-1-2004 
Case Comments: Constitutional Law: Reaffirming Every Floridian’s 
Broad and Fundamental Right to Privacy 
Diane Lourdes Dick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Diane Lourdes Dick, Case Comments: Constitutional Law: Reaffirming Every Floridian’s Broad and 
Fundamental Right to Privacy, 56 FLA. L. REV. 447 (2004). 
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty/528 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Seattle University School of 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact coteconor@seattleu.edu. 
CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: REAFFIRMING EVERY FLORIDIAN'S
BROAD AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
North Florida Women's Health & Counseling Services v. State, No.
SCO1-843, 2003 WL 21546546 (Fla. July 10, 2003)
Diane Lourdes Dick* **
In 1999, the Florida Legislature passed the Parental Notice of Abortion
Act (the Act), which required minors seeking an abortion to either notify
a parent prior to the procedure or obtain court approval to waive parental
notice.1 A minor choosing the latter option must demonstrate to a court
that she is either mature enough to make the decision or that, despite a
court's finding that she lacks sufficient maturity, parental notification is
clearly not in her best interest.2
The statute has never been enforced.3 Pro-choice activists4 quickly filed
suit in circuit court and obtained an injunction to enjoin enforcement of the
Act.5 The circuit court ruled that the Act violated a minor's right to privacy
* I dedicate this Comment to my parents, John and Lourdes Dick. I also wish to thank
Danaya Wright for her help and guidance.
** Editor's Note: This Case Comment received the George W. Milam Award for the best
Case Comment written during Fall 2003.
1. The Act reads in pertinent part:
A termination of pregnancy may not be performed or induced upon a minor unless
the physician performing or inducing the termination of pregnancy has given at
least 48 hours' actual notice to one parent or to the legal guardian of the pregnant
minor of his or her intention to perform or induce the termination of
pregnancy.... If actual notice is not possible after a reasonable effort has been
made, the physician or his or her agent must give 48 hours' constructive notice.
Parental Notice of Abortion Act § 1, FLA. STAT. § 390.01115(3)(a) (2003). Parental notice is not
necessary if the procedure is performed because of a medical emergency, if the parent or guardian
has waived notice in writing, or if the patient waives notice based on her status as a married or
emancipated minor or because she already is the parent of a dependent child. Id.
§ 390.01115(3)(b)(l)-(5).
2. Id. § 390.01115(4).
3. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs. v. State, No. SC01-843, 2003 WL
21546546, at *1 (Fla. July 10, 2003).
4. Id. The plaintiffs below included "several women's clinics, women's rights groups, and
physicians." Id.
5. Id. The plaintiffs below argued that the Act was an unconstitutional infringement on a
minor's right to privacy under the Florida Constitution and corresponding case law. Id.
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under the Florida Constitution.6 The First District Court of Appeal
reversed, finding that although the Act interfered with a fundamental right,
it advanced a compelling state interest and was therefore valid.7 The
Supreme Court of Florida granted a petition for discretionary review,' and,
recognizing that the Florida Constitution contains a broad right of privacy
applicable to minors,9 HELD, that the Act was unconstitutional because it
failed to further a compelling state interest.'0
The Florida Constitution declares that "[e]very natural person has the
right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's
private life."" As interpreted by the Supreme Court of Florida in Winfield
v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering,2 this enumerated right is
fundamental and was intended to be much broader than any privacy right
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. " The state may not infringe
6. Id.
7. Id at *2. The district court recognized that a minor's privacy rights encompass her
decision to seek an abortion, but nonetheless held that the Act was a valid advancement of
compelling state interests through the least intrusive means. State v. N. Fla. Women's Health &
Counseling Servs., 825 So. 2d 254,270 (Fla. Ist DCA 2001). Specifically, the court found that the
Act enabled parents and guardians to assist dependent minors following a surgical procedure. Id.
8. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., 2003 WL 21546546, at *2.
9. Id. at* 16.
10. Id. at *20. The court reaffirmed its holding in In re T. W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989),
quashed the district court's ruling, and affirmed the trial court's permanent injunction to prevent
the Act's enforcement. Id.
11. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. The section further provides that the right of privacy "shall not
be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by
law." Id.
12. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
13. Id. at 548. The Winfield decision explained:
The citizens of Florida opted for more protection from governmental intrusion
when they approved article I, section 23, of the Florida Constitution. This
amendment is an independent, freestanding constitutional provision which
declares the fundamental right to privacy. Article I, section 23, was intentionally
phrased in strong terms. The drafters of the amendment rejected the use of the
words "unreasonable" or "unwarranted" before the phrase "governmental
intrusion" in order to make the privacy right as strong as possible. Since the
people of this state exercised their prerogative and enacted an amendment to the
Florida Constitution which expressly and succinctly provides for a strong right of
privacy not found in the United States Constitution, it can only be concluded that
the right is much broader in scope than that of the Federal Constitution.
Id. As the court later explained in T. W., while federal privacy jurisprudence acknowledges a
privacy right that extends to the individual's decision-making in issues related to "marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education," the Florida
constitutional right of privacy protects a much broader range of interests than the federal right of
privacy. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191-92 ("We have found the right implicated in a wide
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upon a fundamental right unless it does so to advance a compelling interest
through the least intrusive means. 14 In a constitutional challenge, the state
bears the burden of demonstrating that its actions meet this test. 5 Any
state infringement upon the right to privacy, regardless of the class of
persons involved, should be analyzed under the Winfield standard.'6
In Winfield, the first case to interpret the privacy provision, state
officials 7 issued subpoenas to financial institutions requesting access to
petitioners' bank records.' 8 Petitioners, private citizens, were not informed
of the investigation.'9 When they discovered that their records had been
subpoenaed, petitioners filed suit alleging that the state unlawfully violated
their privacy rights.2" The court held that although the compelling interest
standard provides strong protection for fundamental rights, the standard
does not create an absolute prohibition against state intrusion.2' Thus,
although Floridians have a reasonable expectation that their banking
records will remain shielded from public view,22 the state has a compelling
interest in investigating gambling in the racing industry.2" By issuing
subpoenas to obtain records, the state utilized the least intrusive means of
achieving its interest.24
The broad, enumerated right to privacy, and its privileged status based
on Winfield's compelling state interest standard, was extended to minors
in In re T. W In that case, a parental consent statute required minors to
seek parental consent or obtain court approval for an abortion. 26 Since the
range of activities dealing with the public disclosure of personal matters. Florida courts have also
found the right involved in a number of cases dealing with personal decision-making.").
14. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
15. Id. The Winfield test is one of "strict scrutiny" review. Id. Although the court never uses
this phrase, the articulated test is consistent with the highest level of review in constitutional
challenges. The Supreme Court of Florida has used the phrases "compelling state interest" and
"strict scrutiny standard" interchangeably to refer to the same rigid test. Florida Bd. of Bar
Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 79 (Fla. 1983).
16. See In re T. W., 551 So. 2d at 1193. For a discussion of this decision's impact on privacy
jurisprudence, see infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
17. Winfield, 477 So. 2d. at 546. Respondents were agents of the Florida Department of




21. Id. at 547.
22. Id. at 548.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989).
26. Id. at 1188-89. A minor choosing the latter option would have to demonstrate to a court
that she is either mature enough to make the decision, or that, despite a court's finding that she
lacks sufficient maturity, the abortion is in her best interests. Id. at 1189. The parental consent
statute required parental approval for an abortion, rather than mere notification. See id.
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language of the constitutional amendment provides that the right extends
to .' [e]very natural person,"' the court found that this necessarily included
those under the age of eighteen.27 Although the statute failed to conform
to the requirements of federal abortion decisions," the court also
acknowledged that, in the case of minors, the state might have additional
interests that necessitate a departure from prior United States Supreme
Court holdings.29 Notably, the state has an interest in protecting minors
and facilitating family autonomy.3°
To determine whether these interests were compelling, the court looked
to the legislature's treatment of minors in similar laws and found vast
inconsistencies.31 Because of the lack of concern for the treatment of
minors in other medical situations, the court found the state's interest in
protecting minors by requiring parental consent and involvement
insufficiently compelling.32 The state's interests in protecting vulnerable
minors and promoting family harmony, though significant, did not support
an infringement on a minor's right to privacy.33 After Winfield and T. W.,
it seemed that all infringements on privacy were to be analyzed under strict
scrutiny. However, this clear rule would not stand for long.
27. Id. at 1193 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23).
28. See id. at 1193-94. Specifically, the court found the Act violated the minor's right of
privacy for the entire duration of her pregnancy. Id. at 1194. This invasion did not advance the
state's interests, as recognized in Roe v. Wade, in protecting potential human life or the health of
the mother. Id. at 1193-94 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)).
29. Id. at 1194. The court explained that there are
three reasons justifying the conclusion that states can impose more restrictions on
the right of minors to obtain abortions than they can impose on the right of adults:
"[T]he peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions
in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child
rearing."
Id. (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979)).
30. For example, the trial court in the instant case determined the legislature's intent by
analyzing the "whereas" clauses that preceded the text of the law. N. Fla. Women's Health &
Counseling Servs. v. State, No. SCO 1-843, 2003 WL 21546546, at *3 (Fla. July 10, 2003). The Act
was intended to "protect minors from their own immaturity, preserve the family unit and parental
authority, prevent, detect and prosecute sexual batteries against minors." Id.
31. In re T. W., 551 So. 2d at 1195. Specifically, the unwed, pregnant minor may consent to
medical treatment and surgery related to her pregnancy, medical treatment of her own minor
children, the termination of her minor child's life support, and her minor child's adoption. Id
32. Id.
33. Id. The court was unwilling to stray from its holding in Winfield and adopt the United
States Supreme Court's lesser judicial scrutiny standard for abortion laws designed to protect
minors. See id. at 1194-95. The court summarized: "In assessing the validity of parental consent
statutes, the federal court applied a relaxed standard; the state interest need only be 'significant,'
not 'compelling,' to support the intrusion." Id.
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The court later retreated from its expansive interpretation of Florida's
privacy right and signaled a departure from the Winfield test five years
later in Jones v. State.34 In that case, adult men convicted of sexual battery
against female minors" challenged the state's statutory rape law36 as an
unconstitutional infringement on the minor's right to privacy and thus to
engage in consensual, intimate acts.37 Specifically, petitioners asserted that
because T. W recognized a minor's right to make personal decisions that
traditionally fall within the zone of privacy, a minor should also be
protected in her decision to engage in sexual intercourse."
The Jones court rejected the defendants' broad reading of T. W and
concluded that the earlier decision recognized only a limited right of
privacy for minors, extending solely to the realm of abortion and other
medical decisions.39 However, the court held that even if a minor had an
expectation of privacy in the realm of sexual behavior, the state had a
compelling interest in protecting children from sexual exploitation.4 As
the majority and separate opinions noted, this interest is reflected in the
state's consistent enactment of laws to protect minors from mistreatment
and is supported by secondary sources.4' Significant empirical research
details the emotional and psychological damage that occurs when minors
are seduced or forced to engage in sexual activity before they are ready.42
The Jones court did not need to consider whether the challenged
legislation advanced the state's compelling interests through the least
restrictive means because it declined to apply the test articulated in
Winfield, preferring a less-stringent balancing test to determine whether
34. 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994).
35. Id at 1085. Two of the petitioners were adult men, ages nineteen and twenty, who were
convicted for having sexual intercourse with fourteen-year-old females. Id.
36. The defendants were charged and convicted for violating FA. STAT. § 800.04 (1991).
Id. at 1085. That section made it a crime for any person to engage in lewd or sexual acts with, or
in the presence of, "'any child under the age of 16 years."' Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 800.04). The
statute further provided that, "'[n]either the victim's lack of chastity nor the victim's consent is a
defense to the crime proscribed by this section."' Id
37. Id. at 1085.
38. Id
39. Id The court rejected a broad reading of T. W., finding instead that "the rationale for
declaring a right of privacy in T. W. was based on the fact that a minor possessed a right of privacy
with respect to other types of medical and surgical procedures." Id. at 1087.
40. Id.
41. Id at 1086; id. at 1088-90 (Kogan, J., concurring). Justice Kogan discusses findings from
a broad range of sources, including academic literature published in law reviews and peer-reviewed
medical and social science journals, as well as government-commissioned statistical reports. Id.
(Kogan, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 1088-89 (Kogan, J., concurring).
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the state's intrusion was justified.43 Because the state was able to articulate
a significant interest, the court concluded that the law was valid."
After Jones, minors enjoyed only a limited right of privacy, possibly
confined to the abortion and medical arenas. This was markedly different
from the broader right of privacy extended to adults, which included
autonomy in making decisions about sexual behavior.45 Even moreimportant, the Jones decision established that the right to privacy may be
fluid or variable based on age or capacity,46 and suggested that state
encroachments need not be analyzed under the Winfield standard.47
In the instant case, the court signaled a return to the T. W. court's
recognition of a minor's broad right of privacy, and re-emphasized that
governmental infringements must endure strict scrutiny review.4 The
instant court reiterated the finding in TW. that the privacy amendment
applies to minors: "[Biased on the unambiguous language of the
amendment: The right of privacy extends to '[e]very natural person.'
Minors are natural persons in the eyes of the law .... ,"9 Moreover, the
instant court repeated its earlier rejection of federal privacy jurisprudence
on a minor's right to an abortion,"° noting that the Florida Constitution's
right to privacy does not permit a lesser standard of review for cases
43. See id. at 1086. The court explained, "The State has the prerogative to safeguard its
citizens, particularly children, from potential harm when such harm outweighs the interests of the
individual." Id. (citing Griffin v. State, 396 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1981)).
44. Id. at 1087. The court concluded that "[t]he rights of privacy that have been granted to
minors do not vitiate the legislature's efforts and authority to protect minors from conduct of
others.... Florida has an obligation and compelling interest in protecting children. .. ." Id.
Therefore, the court upheld the decision of the district court and ruled that the statute was a valid
exercise of legislative power. Id.
45. The decision reflects the court's reservations about extending to minors a right ofprivacy
that includes autonomy in making decisions about sexuality or intimate behavior. See id.
46. This interpretation would possibly call into question the Supreme Court of Florida's
earlier ruling that incompetent patients have a vested right of privacy. See State v. Herbert, 568 So.
2d 4, 12 (Fla. 1990). In that case, the court held that the privacy right encompasses the decision to
refuse medical treatment. Id. at 10. Reviewing prior decisions, the court concluded that "our cases
have recognized no basis for drawing a constitutional line between the protections afforded to
competent persons and incompetent persons. Indeed, the right of privacy would be an empty right
were it not to extend to competent and incompetent persons alike." Id. at 12. (citing In re
Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)). Therefore, the incompetent
patient retains the right of privacy, and a guardian or proxy may exercise that right on the patient's
behalf. Id at 13.
47. See Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087.
48. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs. v. State, No. SC01-843, 2003 WL
21546546, at *7 (Fla. July 10, 2003).
49. Id. (quoting In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192-93 (Fla. 1989)).
50. Id. at *20.
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involving minors." It retained the stringent Winfield test as applicable to
all infringements on the right to privacy. 2
The court reiterated that a minor's rights under T. W stem from her
entitlement to the broader set of privacy rights applicable to adults and
protected by the Florida Constitution. 3 It also rejected the state's argument
that the parental notice requirement was a mere procedural step that left a
minor's right to an abortion virtually undisturbed. 4 Instead, the right to
privacy is not the eventual access to an abortion, but rather the Floridian's
general right of personal decision-making.5 The Act infringed on
fundamental rights by forcing the pregnant minor to reveal her situation to
her family or members of the judiciary. 6
Finding the privacy right applicable to minors, the court next
considered whether the state's interests were sufficiently compelling to
warrant this encroachment.57 Citing T. W, the court noted that the state's
interests in protecting minors and advancing family autonomy are not
compelling since the state continues to neglect these interests in related
legislation. 8 Because the Act did not advance a compelling interest, the
court held it to be an unconstitutional intrusion on a minor's privacy. 9
Concurring and dissenting opinions underscored the instant court's
cautious deliberation of a broader right of privacy for minors, particularly
given the sensitive and controversial nature of activities normally
protected by privacy jurisprudence.' ° In his dissenting opinion, Justice
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. at *7.
54. Id. at* 12-* 14.
55. See id. at *14.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. Specifically, the court noted that because the Florida Legislature had not opted to
amend its laws following T. W., these state interests have not subsequently grown more compelling.
Id. at *15.
59. Id. at* 14.
60. Justice Quince wrote separately to emphasize that when courts are called upon to decide
constitutional matters, the analysis should not be steered by morality or public policy
considerations. Id. at *35 (Quince, J., specially concurring). Justice Quince further explained that
in Florida, privacy is a fundamental right, which encompasses the minor's right to decide whether
to terminate a pregnancy, and any state infringement must survive strict scrutiny review. Id. at *36
(Quince, J., specially concurring).
Justice Lewis, concurring in result only, explained that "T. W. should stand only for the limited
principle that the State's otherwise compelling interest in looking after the health and physical
welfare of its minor citizens cannot support the imposition of a categorical, dramatic parental
consent restriction." Id. at *38 (Lewis, J., concurring in result only). Justice Lewis explained the
danger of a slippery slope: if T. W. is interpreted to mean that the state's interest in protecting
pregnant minors is unactionable, then the ruling could preclude any state regulation of the abortion
procedure. Id. at *37 (Lewis, J., concurring in result only). Finally, he argued that parents have a
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Wells asserted that the majority should have re-examined T. W's
underlying proposition that minors have a reasonable expectation of
privacy from their parents when weighing the abortion decision.61 Since
the Jones court held that minors do not have privacy rights equal to those
vested in adults with regard to intimate sexual decisions, Justice Wells
opined that perhaps the Supreme Court of Florida has already departed
from T. W's most basic premise.62
The instant court acted to safeguard every Floridian's "right to be let
alone, 63 by recognizing the privacy right's continued application to
"'[e]very natural person' ' 6 and by rejecting erosions based on
distinctions, such as age, that are not reflected in the constitutional
amendment. While the Jones court was reluctant to find that minors have
a vested right of privacy equal to that of adults,65 the instant court rejected
that distinction and clarified the substance of privacy rights. This
illumination means that lower courts will not need to waver when
recognizing any category of Floridians' broad and fundamental rights to
privacy.' By clarifying that the right does not merely guarantee eventual
fundamental right to "safeguard the physical well being of their children," and the state has a
compelling interest in securing the rights of parents "to rear their child as they see fit." Id at *46
(Lewis, J., concurring in result only). Lewis found that the challenged Act advances this interest
through the least restrictive means, but it nonetheless fails the majority's legislative consistency
test. Id. (Lewis, J., concurring in result only).
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Wells argued that the court should have upheld the district
court's decision. Id. (Wells, J., dissenting). He concurred with Justice Lewis that the challenged Act
properly advances a compelling state interest in protecting parental authority. Id. at *48 (Wells, J.,
dissenting). Justice Wells also questioned whether a minor has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the abortion context, and argued that the majority should have adopted the federal "undue
burden" standard. Id. at 51-52 (Wells, J., dissenting) (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 876 (1992)). Finally, the dissent questioned whether legislative consistency is an appropriate
means of testing whether the state's interests are compelling. Id. at *52 (Wells, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at *51 (Wells, J., dissenting).
62. Id. (Wells, J., dissenting).
63. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
64. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., 2003 WL 21546546, at *7 (quoting FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 23).
65. In Jones v. State, the court explained its holding in T. W. as recognizing only "that the
right to privacy encompasses a minor's right to terminate a pregnancy. Under the statute at issue
in T. W, a minor was permitted to consent without parental approval to any medical procedure
involving her pregnancy or her existing child, except abortion." 640 So. 2d 1084, 1086-87 (Fla.
1994). Therefore, the Jones court interpreted T. W. as granting the minor a limited right of privacy
that applies only to abortions and other medical procedures. See id. The Jones court further
cautioned: "T. W. did not transform a minor into an adult for all purposes." Id. at 1087.
66. The instant court reiterated its findings in T. W. and emphasized that the right of privacy
in the abortion decision-making process extended to minors "'based on the unambiguous language
of the amendment: The right of privacy extends to "[elvery natural person." Minors are natural
persons in the eyes of the law and "[clonstitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority." N. Fla. Women's Health &
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access to an abortion, the court reiterated the expansive nature of the
Florida privacy right and ensured its continued application to a range of
personal decisions.
The instant case also underscored that judicial recognition of a vested,
fundamental right does not necessarily block future legislative
curtailments of that right.67 The state may infringe a fundamental right by
satisfying the applicable standard of review.68 Where a Floridian's right of
privacy is concerned, however, the instant case confirmed that the Winfield
strict scrutiny test must be applied; a weaker standard will not suffice.69
The importance of the instant case and its refinement of Florida privacy
jurisprudence is illustrated by a comparison to the Jones decision. The
Jones court's reluctance to accept that a minor may have a right of privacy
in the realm of sexual decision-making ° has been soundly rejected, at least
in the case of consensual behavior. The instant case confirms that even if
a court recognizes that minors have a vested, fundamental right to privacy
spanning the decision to engage in sexual intercourse, and even if it
subjects state infringements on that right to the highest standard of review,
it would not necessarily deprive the state of its right to regulate sexual
activity with and among minors.7 As the Winfield test makes clear, the
state may restrict fundamental rights in order to advance a compelling state
interest through the least intrusive means.7 Ironically, even if the Jones
court had interpreted T. W as granting a minor a right to privacy in sexual
decision-making, and subjected the challenged law to the stringent
Winfield analysis, it most likely would have upheld the statutory rape
provisions anyway. The challenged legislation in Jones arguably advanced
Counseling Servs., 2003 WL 21546546, at *7 (quoting In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192-93 (Fla.
1989)) (citations omitted).
67. The Winfield court succinctly expressed this principle: "The right of privacy does not
confer a complete immunity from governmental regulation and will yield to compelling
governmental interests." Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 577 (Fla.
1985).
68. Id.
69. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., 2003 21546546, at *7. The instant court
explained that while the federal right of privacy permits state encroachments to advance a
significant state interest, Florida privacy jurisprudence demands strict scrutiny. Id. Therefore,
compelling interests must be identified before the state may infringe on this fundamental right. Id.
70. See Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087.
71. See N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., 2003 WL 21546546, at *7-*8.
72. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
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the state's articulated compelling interests 73 through the least intrusive
means.
74
Indeed, the danger of a slippery slope was far more likely following the
more restrictive Jones decision.7' By interpreting T. W. as extending to
minors only a limited and particularized right of privacy, and by applying
a standard other than the strict scrutiny analysis adopted by the Winfield
court,76 Jones opened the door to greater amounts of governmental
interference. The decision described a right that did not necessarily protect
"all natural persons" or the myriad categories of daily activity that prior
case law considered.77 If the right of privacy did not fully extend to
minors, then future decisions could find that the right fails to protect others
who lack full legal capacity even though they are certainly "natural
persons" under Florida's privacy amendment.7" This gradual diminishing
effect would pervert the constitutional guarantee of privacy that is more
protective than the federal right, and extends equally to all citizens.7 The
application of a lesser standard of review would enable the state to
gradually erode privacy rights simply by announcing a compelling or
significant interest.
73. Even though it chose to adopt a limited interpretation of the right to privacy recognized
in T. W., the Jones court appeared to continue its analysis in the alternative, thereby recognizing the
possibility that a minor may have a right of privacy that encompasses her decisions to engage in
sexual intercourse. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087. This point is evidenced by the fact that even after
dispensing with the notion that T. W. grants the minor a right of privacy that extends beyond
abortion or other medical procedures, the court continued to consider whether the state's interests
outweighed those of the individual. Id. The court concluded that even if the minor had an
expectation of privacy under these facts, the state had a compelling interest in protecting minors
from sexual mistreatment. Id. The state's interest was supported by consistent legislation to protect
vulnerable minors and by voluminous research documenting the effects of sexual assaults on
children below the age of consent. Id. at 1088-90 (Kogan, J., concurring).
74. A court may choose to consider the arguments presented by Justice Kogan's concurring
opinion and conclude that the statutory rape law satisfies the least intrusive means test. Justice
Kogan explained that it would be virtually impossible to carve a "maturity exception" into the
statutory rape law. Id. at 1089 (Kogan, J., concurring). Indeed, such a provision would likely result
in an overly vague law that provided little protection to victimized minors. Id. (Kogan, J.,
concurring). For instance, a defendant charged with violating the statute need only prove to a court
that although he engaged in sexual relations with a minor, his conduct was lawful because he
reasonably concluded that the minor was sufficiently mature to consent. See id. (Kogan, J.,
concurring). Therefore, Justice Kogan found that, "the legislature is both reasonable and prudent
in creating a bright-line cut-off at a specific age." Id. (Kogan, J., concurring).
75. See supra note 60 (discussing Justice Lewis' concerns of a slippery slope made possible
by the instant court's decision).
76. See Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087.
77. See supra note 13.
78. See supra note 46.
79. See supra note 13.
[Vol. 56
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Nevertheless, even when the right is interpreted broadly, no category
of Floridians enjoys absolute privacy." The state may legislate to protect
health, safety, and well-being--even if this requires interference with
privacy-so long as the invasion advances a compelling interest through
the least intrusive means." Where minors are concerned, the state's long
history of legislation protecting children, as well as the law's general
recognition of a minor's inability to make binding contracts, 2 will often
provide the support and evidence of consistency needed to uphold new
protective legislation.3 Even where the state's actions cannot be compared
to prior laws," the state can demonstrate that its interests are compelling
by introducing objective, empirical evidence that documents a need for
governmental intervention. 5
By returning to T. W 's recognition of a minor's entitlement to a broad
right of privacy, and by re-emphasizing that state infringements on this
right must endure strict scrutiny review, 6 the instant case upheld a more
general right of privacy in Florida. By so ruling, the instant case did not
render this right absolute, nor did it bind the hands of the Florida
legislature. Rather, the decision purified privacy jurisprudence by vesting
a broad right that can be infringed only when the state meets the Winfield
test. 7 Indeed, the instant case carves a more difficult path for
governmental infringements that purport to advance state interests which
have been ignored in prior legislation and lack adequate support from
80. Perhaps the clearest example of the state's ability to overcome the fundamental right of
privacy to advance a compelling state interest through the least intrusive means is Winfield v.
Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985). In that case, which established the
constitutional right of privacy as a fundamental right deserving of highest judicial scrutiny, the
court ruled in favor of the state and found that the challenged infringement advanced a compelling
interest through the least intrusive means. Id. at 548.
81. Id. at 547.
82. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1201 (Fla. 1989) (Overton, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
83. The instant case reiterated the importance of legislative consistency, explaining that". [it
is not enough for the state to say that an interest is compelling. It must be demonstrated through
comprehensive and consistent legislative treatment." N. Fig. Women's Health & Counseling Servs.
v. State, No. SC01-843, 2003 WL 21546546, at *14 (Fla. July 10, 2003) (quoting the trial court
record).
84. For example, as technology creates new dangers for minors, the state may need to
develop novel regulations that cannot be compared to prior laws. However, the state may
nonetheless demonstrate its compelling interest by providing empirical evidence of the threat to
minors.
85. The Jones decision provides a clear example of the state's ability to demonstrate that its
interests are compelling through secondary, empirical data sources. See supra notes 41-42 and
accompanying text.
86. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., 2003 WL 21546546, at *20.
87. Id.
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objective, empirical sources.8 8 Most often, this would include laws
designed to limit access to morally or socially unpopular, though legal,
prerogatives. Viewed in this light, the instant case is a powerful example
of judicial intervention to protect the individual's rights from the whim
and caprice of the majority.
88. Id. at *29.
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